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REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
ADVERSE POSSESSION

T

HE most noteworthy case in the field was Orsborn v. Deep
Rock Oil Co.' It involved a suit for title, by the adverse pos-

sessor, under the ten-year statute of limitations,2 against the record
owners, to a 56-acre tract of land. This tract was the southernmost
tract of three tracts of land which comprised some 747 acres all
enclosed by fence or natural water boundaries. Plantiff's father
had obtained title to 800.5 acres in three deeds, and was under
the erroneous impression that the 747 acres enclosed by fence
had been conveyed by these deeds. Actually be had acquired title
only to the northerly 630 acres. The middle tract of 60 acres
was still in the sovereignty of the soil, also unknown to the plain.
tiff's father.
Plaintiff's father had entered the enclosed tract in 1919 and
remained in possession until his death in 1933, whereupon plaintiff succeeded to the possession and remained thereon, without
dispute, until 1952 when he brought this suit. The topography of
the land was fairly barren with some rough growth and grass.
No improvements were ever erected on the disputed tract and
the nearest watering tank was about a mile or so to the north. It
was never under cultivation, nor did plaintiff or his father ever
pay taxes on the disputed land. However, at all times from 1919
on, a minimum of 30 head of cattle were grazed within the
enclosure, and there was testimony to the effect that they could
be seen at frequent intervals on the disputed tract, and at least
every two weeks plaintiff's men could be seen on horseback within
the disputed tract.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals, 3 which had reversed the judgment of the
trial court, and held that the facts were insufficient to establish
adverse possession in the plaintiff, as a matter of law. The theory
of the majority of the court was that when one holds in reference
I -----Tex._

267 S.W. 2d 781 (1954).
Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon 1948) Arts. 5510, 5514, 5515.
3259 S.W. 2d 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
2Tex.

.
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to deeds there must be actual possession of the additional land
of such character as to give notice of exclusive adverse possession
of such additional land; that the grazing of unenclosed lands was
insufficient to establish adverse possession;4 and that as plaintiff's
father had not constructed the fences they had "no more effect
than if same had never come into existence," 5 hence grazing of
such lands constituted no more than grazing unenclosed lands.
The minority of the court was of the opinion that plaintiff had
established possession and adverse user to satisfy the statute of
adverse possession and noted that the statutory requirements to
"cultivate, use, or enjoy"' are alternative and not cumulative;
and to satisfy this requirement all that-is required is that a use
be adopted that is suitable and reasonable for the land,7 so that
the true owner would have notice of invasion of his possession
by the adverse possessor.
It is submitted that the majority is being unnecessarily technical in characterizing the possession of the plaintiff as non-adverse
in this case; that perhaps when Vineyard v. Brundrett,' relied on
by the majority, was decided in 1897, because of conditions of
travel and communications, it was then necessary to have a
stronger showing of elements of adverse possession than exists
at the present time.
It is the writer's view that all that should be required to characterize possession as adverse is that the use be in a manner
reasonably calculated to give notice to a true owner who is nonnegligent in observing the condition of his land. In this case if
the true owner had been observant, it is reasonably probable that
he would have noticed evidences of an invasion of his possession
such as would put a reasonably prudent man on inquiry as to
the intent of the possessor. Here the plaintiff had possessed the
land in the only reasonably possible manner, considering the
topography and uses to which the land may be utilized.
The case seems to indicate a strict interpretation of facts consti4 Fuentes v. McDonald, 85 Tex. 132, 20 S.W. 43 (1892).

5 Vineyard v. Brundrett, 42 S.W. 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) error ref.
6 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon 1948) Art. 5510.
7 Nona Mills Co. v. Wright, 101 Tex. 14, 102 S.W. 1118 (1907).
s Note 5, supra.
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tuting adverse possession, where such facts are near the border
line; however, in view of the long and undisputed possession of
the plaintiffs it is submitted that a more liberal attitude would
have come closer to establishing justice between the parties.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES

In the case of Cloud Ash Flooring Co. v. ]. A. Riggs Tractor
Co.9 the Arkansas Supreme Court answered in the affirmative the
question of whether a conditional seller could provide in the chattel mortgage that the lien created thereby would be extended to
the costs of repairs and maintenance rendered by the conditional
seller upon such encumbered chattel.
The contract of sale provided that the buyer would make the
necessary repairs on the equipment, and in default of the buyer
to do so the seller could make such repairs and "....

all moneys

advanced or paid by seller in so doing shall be added to and
be deemed a part of the balance due hereunder and bear interest
at a like rate."
The seller made repairs to the tractor, charging the costs of the
parts and labor to the conditional buyer on open account. The
non-payment of these items formed the gravamen for seller's
enforcing the retained title against the mortgagee of the conditional buyer.
There have been three cases in the state on this question." In
Fassit v. Waldo" and Augusta Cooperage Co. v. Parkham2 the
question was not squarely presented, and, although Hammans
Lumber Co. v. Fricker approved the extension of the lien to
subsequent repairs, the court stated that it was defective as a
precedent since not reported in full. Although the Uniform Sales
Act is in force in Arkansas, it does not apply, conditional sales
being expressly excepted from its operation."
9 -- Ark ---..
, 266 S.W. 2d 284 (1954).
10 Hammans Lumber Co. v. Fricker, 184 Ark. 1193, 42 S.W. 2d 1001 (1931) ; Augusta
Cooperage Co. v. Parkham, 139 Ark. 605, 213 S.W. 737 (1919); Fassit v. Waldo, 57
Ark. 270, 21 S.W. 436 (1893).
11 Note 10, supra.
12 Note 10, supra.
Is Note 10, supra.
14 Ark. Stat. 1947 Ann., Section 68-1479.
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The dissent disagreed with the necessity for the doctrine and
cited statutes 5 under which the lien could have been otherwise
perfected, stating that there should be no extension of the inherent vice of secret liens.
It would seem that the minority is unduly worried as to the
extension of the doctrine to the point of allowing "secret liens,"
for, although the majority expressly declined to express itself on
this point, the case was one where the mortgagee had full knowledge of the lien and of the extent thereof. From the tone of the
opinion it is hard to determine whether the case will be extended
beyond situations where the written instrument must be recorded
by law, as in this case; however, if the conditional seller could
prove actual or constructive notice to the subsequent lienor there
would be no harm in extending the doctrine at least to this extent.
DEEDS

As might be expected, the cases construing deeds and their
effect constituted one of the most prolific areas of decision in the
real property field. Most of the points raised have been well
settled; however, in Texas the trend to strictness in deed descriptions 6 has been confirmed.
The case of Tidwell v. Chesier"7 construed the sufficiency of
a description in a contract of sale, where the contract was fully
executed, a deed having been executed bearing the same description as that shown in the contract of sale. The description set forth
the property as being situated in Ellis County, in two tracts of
land, out of three surveys. The court held that the agent could
not recover on the contract of sale as the description "failed to
furnish within itself, or by reference to some other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land may be identified with reasonable certainty."'"
The next case decided was that of Miers v. Housing Authority
15 Ark.

Stat. 1947 Ann., Sections 51-404, 51-405, 51-409, 51-412.

16 Broaddus v. Grout, 152 Tex. 389, 258 S.W. 2d 308 (1953), comment 8 Sw.L.J. 193.
17 ----Tex ....
,265 S.W. 2d 568 (1954).
18 Id. at p. 569, emphasis added.
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of the City of Dallas19 where the "statement in writing" by which
the condemnation proceeding was begun2" described the property
as being "..

.

lots I and 2, Block 8 of Bonita Plaza Addi-

tion.., and all adjoining and contiguous property owned or
claimed... "21 In upholding the description, the court said that
it was analogous to one describing all the land owned in a state
or county. However, the court commented that, although our rules,
which require identification of the land "either by the instrument
in question or some equally certain extrinsic matter to which the
instrument gives the key,"" seem to require a more certain identification than this, the decisions "have sustained this type of description beyond any possibility of rejecting them now."2
Following the above two Texas Supreme Court cases, there
were two cases in the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals that throw
further light on the type of "key" that must be furnished by
the deed. The first is the case of Wilson v. Meredith, Clegg, &
Hunt,2 4 where a deed description referring to a former deed,
which contained a sufficient description, furnished a proper "key."
The second case is that of Texas Consolidated Oils v. Bartels,25
which approved a description conveying all the oil and gas leases
anywhere within the United States, ".. . any of which are located
within the states ... of Texas." 26 The court declared that it had

long been the rule of this state that a deed purporting to convey
all the land owned by the grantor in the state or in a named county
is sufficient to effect a conveyance.
Rounding out the point, the latest expresion comes from the
very recent Texas Supreme Court case of Rowson v. Rowson,"7
which also concerned a suit on a contract of sale, this being for
a cottage located on Lake Dallas in Denton County. The contract
was formed by a passage of letters. The letter forming the basis
19

___Tex ........,266 S.W. 842 (1954).

Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon 1948) Art. 3264.
Note 19 at p. 843, supra, emphasis added.
22 Note 19 at 844, supra, emphasis added.
23 Alexader v. Byrd, 114 S.W. 2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), error ref.; Sun Oil
Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W. 2d 442 (1935) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex.
540, 84 S.W. 2d 447 (1935).
24 268 S.W. 2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref., n.r.e.
25 270 S.W. 2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), error ref., 9 Sw.L.J. 125.
2e Id. at p. 710.
27 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 197 (Feb. 1955).
20
21
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for this action was one written from the seller, in Dallas, to the
buyer, then living in the cottage on Lake Dallas. The letter had a
Texas dateline, a Dallas address was shown on the letterhead,
the cottage was referred to by the writer as "my cottage," and
directed the buyer that the writer was about to notify the Lake
Dallas Telephone Company to remove the phone in the cottage,
and stated that the buyer's "best bet would be to leave Dallas."
In holding the contract invalid and unenforceable, the court
stated that the letter raised conflicting presumptions as to whether
the cottage was located in Dallas or in Denton County. The court
continued that it is immaterial that the Denton County property was
"in the contemplation of the parties at the time the letters were

written, or even that parole evidence leads the court to believe
that the Denton County property was the subject matter of the
contract, unless the description leads to that conclusion with reasonable certainty, the contract is unenforceable."2
Where, then, are we now? It is writer's view that the following
principles are emerging from the cases:
1. The policy of the court has shifted from one of effectuating the intentions of the parties to one of holding the deed description insufficient
if a third party would not be put on notice, as was first indicated in
the case of Broaddus v. Grout.2 9 This trend has been commented on
by a writer previously,80 and now seems confirmed by statements in
the Rowson case, for there the court admitted that the intention inter se
was known by the court and it seems sufficient evidence existed in the
case to uphold a judgment enforcing the contract, if so desired by
the court.
2. The policy of the Broaddus case will be applied to contracts of sale,
as well as to deeds, as shown by the Tidwell case, and the Rowson case.
This should be a caveat to those whose business involves the incidental drawing of instruments, such as contracts of sale, to seek competent legal advice.
3. The deed must describe the land with sufficient particularity to locate
the situs of the land, situs here meaning the general location on the
ground. If the deed description is not sufficient in itself, then it must
incorporate a written document so that when it is construed with the
2s Id. at p. 199.
29

Note 16, supra.

80 Comment, 8 Sw.LJ. 193 (1954).
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deed the situs of the land may be located. This would seem to be a
fair conclusion to draw from the Tidwell and Wilson cases.
4. The Miers and Texas Consolidated Oils cases, the latter citing Sanderson v. Sanderson", and Pickett v. Bishop12 indicate that if the situs is
located anywhere within a definite area, or continguous to a definitely
located parcel of land, the description is sufficient. However, to be sufficient it must include all the land owned within the area or be all the
land contiguous to the definitely known tract, the theory being that the
third party can be appraised of dealings in such land, since he can
define the area.
5. Deeds that have heretofore been held good having descriptions referable to a particular site such as "my Lake Dallas Cottage," or identified
by a well-known term as "the old mill tract" must be assigned to the
limbo until the court pases on their validity. For under the new doctrine
it would not be possible to locate the situs without reference to unwritten extrinsic evidence, unless such evidence would come under the
cryptic phrase "equally certain extrinsic matter" such as is stated in
the Miers case. Some language in the Rowson case indicates if the
letter had referred to the cottage as "my Lake Dallas cottage" instead
of "my cottage" it would have been sufficient. However, this is mere
dicta, and, since the Broaddus case, anything less than a direct holding
should be eyed dubiously.
Passing from Texas cases to those of Oklahoma, the case of
Little v. Echols"3 presented an excellent discussion on the issue of
whether passing of physical possession without more, constitutes
a valid delivery. The case involved the exchange of deeds by
husband and wife where the deed to the husband was not filed
for record until after the wife's death.
The majority of the court held that not only was it necessary
for actual possession to pass but that there also must be the requisite present intent to pass title, which intent may be determined
from all the surrounding circumstances of the case. Testimony as
to the manifestation of the intent was meager; however, the majority held that the intent manifested was not one to pass a present
title, but rather an intent that the deed constitute a testamentary
disposition. This was derived from testimony that H had stated
that he was looking after W's property because of her health, that
nothing was said about existence of the unrecorded deed until
31 130 Tex. 264, 109 S.W. 2d 744 (1937).
82 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W. 2d 222 (1949).
3 ----- Okla ........ 269 P. 2d 984 (1954).
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after her death, and that H had previously brought suit against
third parties to protect the land, but had brought the suit in
W's name. As there was no requisite intent the deed was void for
failure of delivery during the grantor's lifetime.
The dissent contended that passage of physical possession was
delivery per se and conclusive as to the issue, and also that
the extrinsic acts and statements have no part in determining
whether the delivery was effective.
The majority is clearly right. Although parol evidence is not
admissible to show the character of an instrument as a deed or3
testamentary disposition when the instrument is clear on its face, 4
it is the general rule, 5 the rule in Oklahoma, 6 and the rule in
Texas, 7 that parol evidence is admissible to show whether there
has been a valid delivery, as such fact does not appear on the face
of the deed, and that if parol evidence shows mere passage of
physical possession without more, there is no delivery. This is not
to say that every passage of possession without a formal statement to show the intent is necessarily invalid, for the requisite
intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. 3
FINDING LOST OR MISPLACED GOODS

The case of Couch v. Schley, 9 a Texas Civil Appeals case,
presents a case of first impression in this state on the subject of
finding treasure trove. The treasure trove consisted of $1,000.00
in currency in a glass jar found buried by a workman digging
in the dirt floor of an old garage while preparing to put in a
new floor. The issue presented was whether the money so found
belonged to the owner of the locus in quo, or the workman who
found it.
The owner of the locus in quo contended that the property was
not lost but had been misplaced and as such should be awarded
to him. The court rejected the distinction between lost and mis34 Wilenou v. Handlin, 207 Ill. 104, 69 N.E. 892 (1904).
35 Selby v. Smith, 301 Ill. 554, 134 N.E. 109 (1922).
36 Hull v. Dollarhide, 116 Okla. 180, 244 Pac. 813 (1925).
37 Bibby v. Bibby, 114 S.W. 284 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.
38 Notes 35, 36, 37, supra.
"9272 S.W. 2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error rel.
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placed articles as applying to treasure trove, stating that the distinction only applied in the old English law where casually lost,
abandoned, or misplaced property was awarded to the finder, and
all hidden property was awarded to the King, under the King's
prerogative, and as the State has never claimed such a right the
distinction was invalid in Texas.
The court reviewed English"0 and American 4 precedents and
concluded that there had been no case in England or the United
States where the owner of the locus in quo had prevailed over
the finder of treasure trove. The test stated by the court is:
where money is found while it was hidden or secreted in the earth
...
under such circumstances as to indicate that it had been so hidden or
secreted for a considerable period of time, that the true owner thereof
was unknown, and that in reasonable probability he has either died
without reavealing his secret to42anyone or had abandoned the buried
treasure, the finder will prevail.
The case is in line with the general authority in the United
States; however, as the law of treasure trove is said to generally
be merged with the law of finding lost goods4" it can be seen from
the test applied above, the court conceptually dispenses with the
distinction between misplaced and lost goods. It is submitted
that in the above test the court is actually applying the same test
as that underlying the mislaid - lost goods rationale, and is
doing it without resort to the artificial and technical distinctions
usually applied by cases in this field as to what constitutes a "mislaid" chattel.
The policy set forth is to award the chattels to the one most
likely to be in a position to return the chattels to the true owner,
unless it can be shown that the probability the true owner will
return to claim the chattel is too remote to be a consideration.
WATER AND WATER COURSES

CaliforniaCo. v. Price44 was a hard-fought case of some importance in Louisiana concerning the ownership of land bottoming
40

Armory v. Delamin, 1 Str. 505 (1722).

41 Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913 (1904) ; Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me.

264, 71 Atl. 858 (1908).
42 Note 63 at p. 176, supra.
43 Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 At. 858 (1908).
44 .___La -------74 So. 2d 1 (1954).
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Grand Bay, a navigable body of water. The real issue was the
ownership of royalty payments from a well drilled in the bay.
The heirs of the patentee claimed ownership and contended
that the state was precluded from questioning the validity of the
patent on the grounds of a six-year statute of limitations, passed
in 1916, to run against patent defects. 5
The court, in a 4 to 3 decision, held that the statute applied
to all patents. The minority of the court argued that the sea bot.
tom was of such a nature as not to be capable of private ownership. A bill is in the present session of the Louisiana Legislature
purporting to codify the minority view.
Whether the bottom of navigable waters can be the subject of
private ownership is a question that is not settled by decisions,
and at least three theories have been put forth. The first is that
such land is capable of private ownership,46 the second is that it
is capable of private ownership, but subject to an easement for
public use, 7 and the third is that such land is incapable of private
ownership.4' In some states the test is based more or less on the
size of the body of water in question,4 9 while in others the question has been settled by statute." In Texas the case of Moore v.
Ashbrook" seems to indicate that the first view prevails in this
state, but the case is not entirely in point.
The California Co. case, while not too important as a general
precedent, due to the fact that it is based on local statute, presents
another illustration of the problems that emerge when extremely
valuable mineral assets are injected into an otherwise peaceful
situation.
R. W. Hemingway.
45 Act No. 62 of 1912, LSA-RS., 9:5661.
40 Moore v. Ashbrook, 197 S.W. 2d 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref.
47 Thies v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 137 Neb. 344, 289 N.W.

386 (1939).
48 State v. West Tennessee Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S.W. 746 (1913).
49 People v. Silberwood, 110 Mich. 103, 67 N.W. 1087 (1896) ; Delaplaine v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 214, 24 Am. Rep. 386 (1877) ; Gouverneur v. National Ice
Co., 134 N.Y. 355, 31 N.E. 865 (1892).
50 Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160 (1871).
51 Note 46, supra.

